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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LELAND \V. SIMPER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
HARRY THORSEN and MILDRED 
THORSEN, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Civil No. 8305 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
This is an action to recover damages wherein the 
Plaintiff, Leland W. Simper, alleged that the Defendants 
Harry Thorsen and wife, had unlawfully appropriated 
and diverted to their own use and benefit certain waters 
belonging to the Plaintiff. Defendants admitted the use 
and apvropriation of said water but denied that Plain-
tiff owned any right, title or interest therein. By way 
of Counterclaim Defendants alleged that they were the 
owners of certain real vroperty and appurtenant water 
rights situated in Sevier County, State of lJtah, and 
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Defendants prayed that their title in and to said ap-
purtenant water rights be quieted as against any and all 
adverse claims of the Plaintiff. Defendants further 
prayed for damages by reason of Plaintiff's unlawful 
use and appropriation of said water. 
Defendants appeal from a Decree of the lower Court 
which determined that Plaintiff is the sole owner of 
certain of said water rights and in which the Court re-
fused to decree ownership of certain other of said water 
rights to either Plaintiff or Defendants. Appellants also 
appeal from the Order of said Court denying their :Mo-
tion for a New Trial. Appellants contend that the lower 
Court corrunitted reversable error at law and has mis-
applied proven facts, that the Court's Decree (R. 18-19) 
is contrary to all the admissible evidence and 1nust be 
reversed, and that a new Decree should be entered in 
Defendants' favor. 
STATE~fENT OF FACTS 
The Defendants since 1946 haYe been the owners of 
and in possession of a certain ranch located at Goose-
berry, Salina Canyon, State of Utah, and located South 
of the Plaintiff's farn1. (See Exhibits "A'', "B", "C" 
and ''G"). The Defendants grow grain and alfalfa and 
graze sheep and cattle on their ranch. At the time they 
took possession and obtained title to said property the 
Defendants also obtained certain water rights for use 
on the ranch. In addition to the Gooseberry Creek Water 
used jointl~T by Defendants and Plaintiff and other land-
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owners 1n the area, which water is not involved 
in this litigation, the Defendants obtained title to a 
portion of a certain Spring Area which is located im-
mediately South of the 'South Boundary line of their 
property. This is the area shown in blue on Exhibit 
"A" and is referred to therein as "Spring Area No. 1." 
This area is composed of several distinct springs, 
each one of which has a well defined channel running 
from it. The Spring located at the immediate Northwest 
Corner of Spring Area N" o. 1 flows out of a pipe and 
follows a natural channel a short distance into a pond 
shown on Defendants' Exhibit "A" and referred to as 
the Ernel Peterson Pond. This particular spring of 
water will hereinafter be referred to as the ''piped 
spring." Thereafter, all of the water from said piped 
spring flows out of the pond and into "C" Ditch (Exhibit 
··A") where it intermingles with Gooseberry Creek water 
and subsequently flows in a Northerly direction down a 
wash and eventually finds its way to the Plaintiff's land. 
The Defendants make no claim wha.tever to any of the 
u·ater flowing from the Ernel Peterson Pond. 
Also flowing out from Spring Area No. 1 are waters 
through two additional channels. Both of these water 
sources have well-defined channels running therefrom as 
shown on Exhibit ''A". The water flowing from these 
two springs goes on to Defendants' land immediately 
Korth of Spring Area No. 1, where it is beneficially used 
and employed by Defendants for crop and pasture ir-
rigation. 
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Also, the Defendants clain1 title to an additional 
Spring Area designated on Defendants' Exhibit "A" as 
"Spring Area No. 2". This area consists of a number of 
"seeps" from which a small quantity of water flows on 
to adjoining land owned by the Defendants. Since the 
year 1946, they have maintained a pasture for animals 
on this tract. Defendant Thorsen testified (R. 293) that 
it was his understanding and 'belief from the terms and 
provisions of his Deed to said property and from oral 
representations made to him that Spring Areas 1 and 
2 were appurtenant to his land and that he obtained title 
thereto at the time he purchased said farm property. 
During the month of ~fay, A.D. 1951, Defendants 
began for the first time to have trouble with the Plain-
tiff regarding this water. Both of the ditches at Spring 
Area No. 1 which conveyed water to Defendants' land 
were cut and dammed off and the water therefrom di-
verted to the Plaintiff through the Ernel Peterson Pond 
and "C'' Ditch. This occurred approxi1nately twenty 
( 20) times during the summer of 19·51, and as a result 
most of the water from Spring Area No. 1 failed to reach 
Defendants' land. The Plaintiff acknowledged that he 
was responsible for the cutting and damming off of the 
ditches, and asserted to the Defendants that he claimed 
exclusive right, title and interest in and to all of the 
water flowing frmn Spring Areas 1 and 2. This was the 
first ti1ne that Plaintiff had asserted such a claim al-
though he and Defendants had been neighbors for more 
than five ( 5) years during which time Defendants had 
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1 and 2 except for the piped spring. The dispute cul-
minated with the filing of the Complaint herein on Sept-
ember 19, 1951. 
Although the Plaintiff asked only for damages, and 
not for a Decree quieting title, the Court made and en-
tered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and De-
cree in Plaintiff's favor quieting Plaintiff's title to all 
of Spring Area No. 1, including all of the several water 
sources embraced therein. The Court refused to make 
any award whatever either to Plaintiff or to Defendants 
with respect to Spring Area No. 2. 
The testimony and evidence concerning the issues 
raised herein is voluminous and will be reviewed in de-
tail in connection with the arguments hereinafter made. 
STATE~fENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO.1 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
BRANCH SPRING EMBRACES ALL OF SPRING AREA NO. 
1 AND INCLUDES ALL THE WATER SOURCES THEREIN 
AND IN FINDING THAT BRANCH SPRING IS THE SAME 
WATER SOURCE AS BIG SPRING. 
POINT NO.2 
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
FINDING OF THE .COURT THAT THOMAS W. SIMPER, ONE 
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S PREDECESSORS IN TITLE, AC-
QUIRED OWNERSHIP OF ALL WATERS ARISING FROM 
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SAID BRANCH SPRING (ERRONEOUSLY DESCRIBED BY 
THE COURT AS INCLUDING ALL OF SPRING AREA NO.1), 
BY A CERTAIN DEED EXECUTED BY ONE CHARLES A. 
MOTT. 
POINT NO.3 
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
FINDING OF THE ·COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE 
OWNER AND ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION AND USE 
ON HIS LAND OF ALL THE WATERS FROM BRANCH 
SPRING, WHICH THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CON-
CLUDED WAS THE SAME AS AND EMBRACED ALL OF 
SPRING AREA NO. 1 AND INCLUDED ALL THE WATER 
SOURCES THEREIN. 
POINT NO.4 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING AND 
OVERRULING THE OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO 
THE INTRODUCTION IN EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBITS 1 TO 4, BOTH INCLUSIVE, AND THAT THE 
COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR NONSUIT. 
POINT NO.5 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
AND REFUSING TO FIND, CONCLUDE AND DECREE 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE-NAMED ARE THE 
OWNERS OF ALL WATERS ARISING FROM SPRING AREA 
NO. 1, EXCEPT FOR THE ONE WATER SOURCE LOCATED 
IN THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID AREA AND ·COM-
MONLY REFERRED TO AS "BRANCH SPRING", AND RE-
FERRED TO ABOVE AS THE PIPED SPRING. 
POINT NO.6 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND 
REFUSING TO FIND, CONCLUDE AND DECREE THAT 
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THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE NAMED ARE THE OWNERS 
OF ALL OF THE WATERS ARISING FROM THAT CERTAIN 
AREA KNOWN AND DESCRIBED AS "SPRING AREA NO. 
2" AS DESCRIBED IN THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE 
IN THIS .CAUSE AND AS SHOWN ON DEFENDANTS' EX-
HIBIT "A". 
POINT NO.7 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IN THIS 
CAUSE. 
POINT NO.8 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
FIND IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR UPON THE ISSUE OF 
DEFENDANTS' DAMAGES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO.1 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
BRANCH SPRING EMBRACES ALL OF SPRING AREA NO. 
1 AND INC-LUDES ALL THE WATER SOURCES THEREIN 
AND IN FINDING THAT BRANCH SPRING IS THE SAME 
WATER SOURCE AS BIG SPRING. 
It should be stated at the outset that there are in-
volved in this controversy two distinct groups of water 
sources. The first group is represented by the following 
water sources, to-wit: 
GROUP I: 
1. The Spring located at the immediate North-
west Corner of Spring Area No. 1, which we refer 
to as the piped spring. 
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2. Reservoir No. 2 as specifically described in 
Exhibit No. "3". 
3. The regular Gooseberry Creek water which 
flows across Defendants' land and on to Plaintiff's 
land through ''C" Ditch as shown on Exhibit "A". 
GROUP II: 
1. The remaining water sources found in Spring 
Area No.1. 
2. Spring Area No. 2. 
Appellants desire to make it clear at the very begin-
ning that, as between the Plaintiff and the Defendants, 
there is no dispute or contest regarding the waters be-
longing to Group I above described. Appellants make 
no claim whatever to any of these water rights, except 
to their association shares in and to the regular Goose-
berry Creek water, which said water rights are not con-
tested herein. It is now and always has been the Defen-
dants' position that these waters are not involved in 
this litigation. Defendants clain1 title only to the two 
water sources included in Group II above referred to 
and take the position that this action must be limited to 
a determination of issues involving the second group of 
water rights only. 
Appellants contend that the Findings and Decree 
of the lower Court, as well as its Decision and ~femoran­
dunl of August 1, 1953 (R. 10-19), together with its Order 
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Overruling :Motion for a New ~Crial dated November 19, 
1954, ( R. 21 - 22) all clearly show that the Court failed 
and refused to make any distinction whatever in the 
identity of water rights involved and that the Court has 
erroneously assunwd that all of the waters found within 
the physical boundaries of Spring Area No. 1 are the 
Branch Spring and that the Branch Spring is synony-
mous with the Big Spring. This confusion of the Court 
and its failure to properly interpret the testimony and 
Exhibits with reference to the identity of the water rights 
involved is largely responsible for the award to Plaintiff 
of all of Spring Area No. 1 upon the unfounded assump-
tion that the entire area covered by Spring Area No. 1 is 
I 
the same water source as the Big Spring and the Branch 
Spring referred to in Plaintiff's Exhibits, and that Big 
Spring and Branch Spring refer to the same water. 
As a matter of fact this lawsuit is waged over the 
rights of the respective parties to Spring Areas No. 1 
and 2 as shown in Exhibit "A", but Plaintiff insists that 
these areas are the same as the waters described in his 
Exhibits "1 to 4", both inclusive. These Exhibits consti-
tute Plaintiff's purported chain of title upon the said 
water. Appellants' position with respect to these instru-
ments is simply this, to-wit: 
They are completely incompetent and inadmiss-ible 
to establish amy title to either portion of Spring Areas 
1 or 2 involv,ed in this litigation, for the simp,le re1ason 
that they refer to other ond describe different sources 
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of water completely sepa.rate from and not in amy way 
part of Spring Areas 1 or 2, except for the one Branch 
or piped spring about whi.ch there is no controversy. 
11J oreover, ev.en if they ,actually did describe t.he waters 
invol·ved in this action, which we deny, said Deeds and 
M emora.nd'a are not sufficient, staJY~;ding alon.e, to estab-
lish title in the Plaintiff to said waters. 
Appellants concede that "The Branch Spring of 
Water'' described in Exhibit "3", is situated in and is a 
part of Spring Area No. 1. However, the Court has as-
sun1ed that because it is located within Spring Area 
No. 1, Branch Spring must of necessity be all of Spring 
Area No. 1. The Court also erroneously determined 
that Branch Spring and Big Spring are identical 
water sources. On the basis of such an assumption, 
the Court not only quieted Plaintiff's title to that water 
in Spring Area No. 1 which the Plaintiff admittedly owns 
(the piped spring), but also handed to the Plaintiff the 
waters in Spring Area No. 1 which belong to the Defen-
dants. The error of this assumption is apparent from a 
consideration of the following: 
1. The testimony of the Defendant Harry Thorsen. 
(R. 138 - 140) and Frank Casto (R. 164), and John ~I. 
Bird (R. :23-t) that Spring Area No. 1 is composed of 
several separate, well-defined water sources, all of which 
ha Ye well-nmrked channels going out of the area in 
different directions. 
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2. The testimony concerning the physical topo-
graphy of Spring Area No. 1 which shows that the water 
channel from the piped spring goes out of Spring Area 
No. 1 at a lower elevation than the channels from the 
other sources in Spring Area No. 1, (R. 140) and that 
while the other channels convey water directly to the 
Defendants' land, the water from the piped spring falls 
off in to a pond and then down into the wash at the bottom 
of the canyon ("C" ditch on Exhibit "A") from which it 
eventually flows onto Plaintiff's land, through diversion 
from said wash. 
3. The undisputed testimony of Defendant Harry 
Thorsen, his predecessor in title and possession of his 
farm, John 1\L Bird, and Frank Casto and Janie Nielsen, 
the son and daughter of the original homesteader of the 
Thorsen Farm, whose cumulative acquaintance with the 
topography and use of the land and water goes back to 
the year 1887 (R. 1:>7 and 180), that these physical con-
ditions have existed, except for the construction of the 
Ernel Peterson Pond, for sixty-four (64) years, and that 
the various distinct and separate water channels leading 
out from Spring Area No. 1 have not changed substanti-
ally during that period of time. 
±. The fact that Plaintiff's own testimony gener-
ally confir111~ these physical facts (R. 4-l-, +:>, and 60-7-l- ), 
including Plaintiff"s admissions that the only direction 
the water from the ''piped spring" can take i~ into the 
main channel ("C" Ditch shown on Exhibit "A") and 
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then on to Plaintiff's land; that the water from the piped 
Spring has flowed upon Plaintiff's land ever since Plain-
tiff has been acquainted with the area (R. 94) and that 
his use of this water has never been materially inter-
rupted or interfered with (R. 81); and most important, 
that during the years the Defendants have owned the 
property immediately North of the Spring Area No. 1, 
and for at least part of the time the land was owned by 
John M. Bird prior to Mr. Thorsen, the water from the 
sources within the Spring Area No. 1 other than the piped 
spring flowed on to the lands now owned by the De-
fendants (R. 95 - 98). 
5. The significant facts that Plaintiff's Exhibits 2, 
3 and 4 upon which they must rely to establish their title 
to the water of Spring Area No. 1 uses the language o.f 
two separate isolated water sources. 
We quote fr01n Exhibit "3", to-wit: 
''The branch spring of water lying and being 
situate at the lower end of Kelsey Bird's field, 
Gooseberry Prect. 'Sevier County, Ut .... " 
"Also, Reservoir No. 2, with ditch situated 
near two hwndred yards west of what is generally 
known as Big 8 pring and near one mile 1m a 
southerly direction from the old Ta,ylor D.airy 
Ranch, said ditch runninq in a northwesterly di-
rection to and connecting with the head of Goose-
berry Greek ... " 
This wording clearly indicates that the parties to 
the l\Iott-Simper Deed were dealing with one water 
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source (the branch spring) in one area and wjth another 
separate water source (Reservoir No. 2) in an entirely 
different area. This is conclusively established by the 
fact that Spring Area No. 1 at the lower end of the Kel-
sey Bird field (and which includes the Branch or piped 
spring) is located in the Southwest quarter of Section 
19, Township 22 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. (See Exhibit "A"). However, Big Spring, 
Taylor Dairy Ranch and the headwaters of Gooseberry 
Creek, points used in the ~[ott-Simper Deed to establish 
the location of Reservoir No. 2, were fixed by John l\I. 
Bird, a rangerider in said area for the Brown's Hole 
Grazing Association, with long experience in the area, 
as being in Section 23, Township 23 South, Range 2 East, 
Salt Lake Base and l\feridian, approximately 8 miles 
South of the area in conflict, (R. 225 - 229). 
Also, Lucius Gates, who had herded sheep in the 
Gooseberry country for many years, estimated Big 
Spring, Taylor Dairy Ranch and Reservoir No. 2 to 
be at least 6 miles South of the Thorsen property, (R. 
286), and Frank Casto, the son of the original home-
steader on the Thorsen property, who had a wide exper-
ience in the Gooseberry area, fixed the distance at 8 
miles removed (R. 176 - 179). Most important, Exhibit 
"F", the official map of Sevier County, Utah, clearly 
shows that the testimony of these witnesses is confirmed 
as a matter of geographical fact. 
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The only possible basis for the Court's award of all 
of the waters of Spring Area No. 1 to the Plaintiff would 
be Plaintiff's testimony that he has always considered 
that "the Branch Spring" included all of the waters from 
Spring Area No. 1 without requiring him to prove any 
appropriation under the law of any such waters. 
Appellants assert that the evidence clearly and un-
equivocably demonstrates that "the Branch spring of 
water" in Exhibit ''3" refers to and includes only the one 
piped spring at the Northwest corner of Spring Area No. 
1, that the other sources within Spring Area No. 1 are 
separate and distinct therefrom, and that Reservoir No. 
2 is a water source removed some 8 miles from the area 
in dispute. The Court's failure and refusal to so find, 
in the face of the undeniable evidence to the contrary, 
seriously prejudiced Defendants herein, for they have 
from the beginning disclaimed any title in themselves to 
the one piped spring and to Reservoir No. 2, and if no 
distinction is to be recognized between water sources 
disputed and conceded, it is a constant temptation to the 
Court to close its eyes and ears to the testimony and evi-
dence in the erroneous belief that Defendants have 
conceded that they do not own any of the water rights 
involved in this action. 
POINT NO.2 
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
FINDING OF THE ·COURT THAT THOMAS W. SIMPER, ONE 
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S PREDECESSORS IN TITLE, AC-
QUIRED OWNERSHIP OF ALL WATERS ARISING FROM 
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SAID BRANCH SPRING (ERRONEOUSLY DESCRIBED BY 
THE COURT AS INCLUDING ALL OF SPRING AREA N0.1), 
BY A CERTAIN DEED EXECUTED BY ONE CHARLES A. 
MOTT. 
POINT NO.3 
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
FINDING OF THE .COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE 
OWNER AND ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION AND USE 
ON HIS LAND OF ALL THE WATERS FROM BRANCH 
SPRING, WHICH THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CON-
CLUDED WAS THE SAME AS AND EMBRACED ALL OF 
SPRING AREA NO. 1 AND INCLUDED ALL THE WATER 
SOURCES THEREIN. 
POINT NO.4 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING AND 
OVERRULING THE OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO 
THE INTRODUCTION IN EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBITS "1" TO "4", BO'rH INCLUSIVE, AND THAT THE 
COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR NONSUIT. 
Points 2, 3 and 4 above set forth will be argued 
jointly herein. 
Appellants assert that the Plaintiff, in order to 
recover upon his Complaint, must establish ownership 
in the water rights he claims have been interfered with 
by the Defendants. We acknowledge also that Defend-
ants, on their Counterclaim, must do more than establish 
the nonexistence or inferiority of Plaintiff's title, and 
that in order to prevail upon their Counterclaim De-
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fendants must ~stablish in themselves title to the waters 
descrrbed therein. Sowards et al, vs. M eaqher .et al, 37 
Utah 212, 108 P. 1112. 
Ownership of rights in water is now a n1atter of 
affirmative statutory law (Title 73, Water and I rriqa.-
tion, Ut.ah Code Annotated 1953). In 1903 the Legisla-
ture passed a law providing that in the future the water 
of all streams and other public sources in this State, 
whether flowing above or underground, was public pro-
perty, subject, however, to all existing rights to th.e use 
t.hereof. (Chapter 100, Laws of Utah 1903.) These stat-
utes provide an exclusive method for establishing rights 
in water only after the date of their original enactment, 
to-wit: 1903. The Supreme Court of Utah has on num-
erous occasions held that all rights in water accruing 
prior to 1903 must be established pursuant to governing 
law prior to 1903. Prior to 1903 the law permitted ac-
qusition of title to water by appropriation and beneficial 
use thereof. Patterson vs. Ryan, 37 Utah 410, 108 P. 
1118; Jensen vs. Birch Creek Ranch Company, 76 Utah 
356, 289 P. 1097 ; Wells ville East Valley Irrigation Com-
pany vs. Lindsay Land and Livestock Contpany, 104 Utah 
448, 137 P. 2d 634; Wrathall vs. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 
p 2d. 755. 
In the recent Utah case of Bishop v. Duck Creek Irri-
gation ComJHMzy et. al, 241 P. 2d 162, the Utah Supreme 
Court has confirmed the foregoing rule and has held as 
follows: 
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"Since there are no filings with the State 
Engineer either by Bishop or his predecessors, 
whatever rights he has to the water must neces-
sarily rest upon appropriation by beneficial us,e 
before the year 1903. Prior to that time the law 
allowed appropriation by such use, and statutes 
enacted that year preserve such appropriation". 
We take it, therefore, to be the prevailing law in the 
State of Utah, that whoever first appropriated water 
by beneficial use thereof prior to 1903 is to be adjudged 
the owner thereof and entitled to pass title thereto. 
Taking Plaintiff's evidence in its most favorable 
light, it is at once apparent that his claim to owner-
ship of the waters in dispute, is grounded entirely upon 
written instrun1ents (Exhibits "1" to "4", both inclusive). 
The effect of Exhibits "1", ":2" and"-!", insofar as vesting 
in the Plaintiff the title to any water rights is concerned, 
hinges upon the question as to whether or not Charles A. 
:Jiott, the Grantor in Exhibit ''3 ", had any title to waters 
to convey to his Grantee, Thomas W. Simper, the Plain-
tiff's predecessor in interest. In view of the fact that the 
record shows that none of Plaintiff's witnesses had any 
actual acquaintance with either the real property now 
owned by the Plaintiff or the waters in dispute in this 
action, prior to the )'ear 1908, as will be discussed in dP-
tail hereinafter, Plaintiff must rely upon said instru-
ments to establish his title. We take it as obvious, there-
fore, that if I >Jain tiff's Exhibit "3" is not effective a1-: c1-:-
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tablishing ownership to water rights and transferring 
the same, then Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie 
case of ownership of water rights prior to 1903, and his 
Exhibits 1 to 4 are not admissible. 
Exhibit ''3" is a Deed to certain described water rights. 
The instrument is dated December 31,1888. Passing over 
the matter of the identity of the waters described in the 
~1ott-Si1nper Deed, which we have heretofore discussed 
in this Brief, and assuming for the purpose of argument 
that the instrument described the water sources which 
are actually in controversy between the Plaintiff and 
the Defendants, w·hich we expressly deny, neverthless 
we most earne'stly contend that said '''Vater Deed", 
standinq alone, is absolutely ineffectual as proof of 
ownership of water rights. Said instrument is entirely 
a self-serving unsupported declaration and passes no 
interest in water rights under the Utah Law in the ab-
sence of proof of such appropriation and beneficial use 
thereof by the Grantor therein as would establish owner-
ship of the waters in himself under the laws of Utah 
prior to 1903. 
As above set forth, the Law prior to 1903 was simply 
one of acquisition of rights in waters by appropriation 
through beneficial use. The Jaw recognized no certifica-
tion or recording of such rights; it was aU a 1natter of 
proof of use, not a chain of paper title. An examination 
of the historical developn1ent of water rights in Utah 
prior to 1903 and a consideration of the cases herein-
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above cited will, we feel, convince the Court that when 
water rights are contested, the only competent and ad-
missible evidence going to the establishn1ent of such 
rights prior to 1903 is evidence of actual physical ap-
propriation and beneficial use. Deeds and memoranda 
of a self-serving nature, which assert ownership but do 
not prove it, such as the Mott-Simper Deed and Plain-
tiff's Exhibits "1'', ''2'' and "-1:", are and ought to be in-
competent and inadmissible as proof of ownership of 
water where the title of the water is in controversy. 
Appellants further contend that the provisions of 
78-25-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, providing for the 
reading into evidence of all instruments affecting real 
property which are properly acknowledged, without 
proof of execution, does not avail Plaintiff anything be-
cause the crux of the matter is not the execution of the 
~lott-Nimper Deed (Exhibit "3") or its genuineness as an 
instrument, but rather, proof of appropriation and bene-
ficial use of water upon land. If such were not the case, 
any person could, prior to 1903, by the act of executing 
a Water Deed, establish his rights and those of his 
Grantee to ownership of water without any valid ap-
propriation thereof. Such a device is contnn~T to publie 
policy and the history of the development of water right~ 
in this State. The title a Grantee secures depends on the 
title his Grantor had, and such Grantor's title mu;;;t Jw 
established and proved. 
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Appellant's position is well stated in K inrney on 
Irrigation and Water Rights, Second Edition, Follllnc 
3, 8ection 1554, page 2803, to-wit: 
"Upon the one asserting a claim to the right 
to the use of water regardless upon what he bases 
his right, _rests the burden of proving his claim as 
set up in his pleadings by a preponderance of all 
of the evidence admitted in the case on the point in 
question. And although a Plaintiff under a claim 
of general ownership may prove his title to the 
right by appropriation, adverse possession and 
user, or purchase, all of the essential elements of 
the acquisition of his right must be proven ac-
cording to the nature of the claim which he makes 
to it. Therefore, if the theory of his claim is that 
of prior appropriation, he must prove all of the 
elements which are necessary to make a prior 
appropriation, including the beneficial use of all 
of the water claimed ... If he base·s his claim upon 
a purchase from an appropriator, he must not 
only prove a valid .appropriation by his Grantor, 
but he must also prove his right to his claim by 
proving the purchase." 
See the cases of St. George & Washington Canal Co. 
vs. Hurricane Canal Co. 93 Utah 262, 72 P. 2d. 642; S.aliM 
Creek Irriga.tion Co. rs. Salina Stock Co. 7 Utah 456, 27 
P. 578; Campbell L'. Nunn, 78 Utah 316 2 P. 2d 899, 
Bi . ..,·hol' v. D11ck Creek Irrigation Company, supra, where 
these rules are applied to differing factual situations. 
What then is the nature and extent of Plaintiff's 
proof of appropriation of the water in controversy¥ 
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Plaintiff asserted during his direct examination that 
he had been using all of the water from Spring Area No. 
1 on his farrn ever since his purchase in 1930 (R. 42). 
However, under Cross-Examination Plaintiff changed his 
story and admitted that while he had used all of the 
water which had come down to his farm through the main 
channel (' 'C" Ditch on Exhibit "A") from out of the 
Frands Peterson Fish Pond, and that this has never been 
interfered with (R. 81 and 93), the remainder of the 
\\·ater frmn Spring Area No. 1, (which is the water really 
involved in this controversy) has gone to the Defendants' 
land both during Defendants' period of ownership and 
also during the ownership of J'ohn }.f. Bird, Defendants' 
predecessor in Title (R. 92 to 97) 
George Thomas Simper, Plaintiff's brother, testified 
that his knowledge of the situation went back to the year 
1908 and extended up to the year 1945 (R. 100). Although 
Simper maintained that the water had ah\·a~·~ been used 
on the Mott-Simper property from out of the main 
channel ("C" Ditch on Exhibit "A"), nevertheless, he 
conceded that at least part of the water from Spring Area 
No. 1, during all of the 37-year period fron1 1908 to 1945, 
may have been used by Abel ~l. Ca~to on his homestead, 
which is the same property as now owned by the Defend-
ants (R. 104-106). 
We quote directly from the record ( R. 109) : 
"Q. (By .Mr. Mattsson) : Now, i~n't it a f'ad 
.\Ir. Sin1per, that at all times during the hi~tor; 
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of this, as far back as you can rernen1ber, that the 
water from these Branch Springs, \vith exception 
of that Pipe Spring, has gone onto ~Ir. Thorsen's 
spring (land) or his predecessors', the people 
before him? 
"A. (By George Thomas Sin1per): It mav have 
been, all bu't the Pipe system, but the. piped 
system didn't. 
Q. The Pipe system went into tlus channel? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And all of the other water rnay have gone into 
this ditch? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that is true back as far as vou can re-
member, back to 1910 or 1908? · 
A. That's right." 
Plaintiff's next witness, Rene Curtis, stated that 
he worked for Plaintiff's father on the Simper property 
forty years ago, or in 191~, and that his knowledge of 
the situation goes back no further than this time (R. 112). 
As with Plaintiff's other witness, Curtis rnaintained that 
the Simper people used all of the water which reached 
their land through the rnain channel but Curtis, like the 
others of Plaintiff's witnesses, acknowledged that except 
for the regular Gooseberry Creek \Yater and the water 
frorn the one piped spring, all of the other Simper water 
was in fact waste water fron1 off the Casto-Thorsen farm. 
IIere is another dear-cut adrnission that as early as 1912 
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water from Spring Area No. 1 was being used on Defend-
ants' premises. We quote again from the record at Page 
113, to-wit: 
"Q. (By ~Ir. 1Iattsson) : Now, does the Goose-
berry Creek water come in that same draw? 
A. (B~, :Mr. Curtis): It came from the springs, 
from the waste water is what it was. 
Q. It was the waste water you said 1 
A. Off the Abe Casto farm. 
Q. It was the waste water from the Abe Casto 
farm? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, :Jlr. Curtis, this water was 
used on the Abe Casto farm and then the 
waste water went into this channel or this 
draw and it went down to the Simpers' place, 
is that correct 1 
A. That is the way it was, yes, sir." 
Harry 1\:Iiller, also a witness for Plaintiff, testified 
that he worked on Plaintiff's farm about 23 years ago 
and that he irrigated the Simper farm from water com-
ing down the main channel (R. 125). On Cross-Examina-
tion ::\(illt•r admitted that this water consisted of ( J oo~P-
berry Creek flow (not involved in this litigation), and 
some "Spring Water", the identity or sonr<'e of which 
he did not know ( R. 126). 
This same witness also testified that after I><'I'Pndant 
~rhorsen bought his fann he worked for Defendant and 
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irrigated Defendant's farn1 with water flowing from out 
of Spring Area No. 1 (R. 126). The water reached the 
Thorsen property through two well-established ditches 
(R. 127). 
Frands Peterson testified that his son Ernel Peter-
son is now the record owner of the "Kelsey Bird field" 
referred to in the :Mott-Si1nper Deed (Exhibit No. "3") 
in the Northwest corner of which Spring Area No. 1 is 
located. 1Ir. Peterson has lived in a s1nall cabin near 
Spring Area No. 1 for about 12 years (R. 115). Peterson 
stated that he had no knowledge whatever concerning the 
water situation prior to about 1940, but that at the time 
he n1oved into the cabin, "there was a big stream of water 
and it was going right down the main channel", (R.120). 
On Cross-Examination he acknowledged that the stream 
contained high water run-off, Gooseberry Creek water 
and waste water frmn off his land. But the following 
frmn l\Ir. Peterson's testi1nony is so significant that we 
quote it in full frmn the Record (R. 121 and 122) : 
··Q. (By ~fr. ~Iattsson): Now, :Jir. Peterson, 
when you first went in there, there were two 
ditches, weren't there, extending Northeast-
erly from this area that is called the Branch 
Springsf 
A. (By ~Ir. Peterson): Yes, sir, two ditches. 
Q. Ditches leading to Thorsen property that he 
irrigated frmn those ditches? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And they were there when you moved In 
there1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And they were used, weren't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. l\Ir. Thorsen used them to take water from 
those Spring Areas on to his property and 
irrigate iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he has done it ever since 1 
A. And he ha:s been doing it off and on ever 
since. 
Q. \:Veil, whenever he needed to irrigate, hadn't 
he1 
A. \Veil, I couldn't answer that. I don't know. 
Q. X ow, you moved into this area before :\lr. 
Thorsen bought in here, didn't you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Jack Bird used the water the same wa)~, 
did he not~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. So he used the water out of these Branch 
Springs to irrigate this property that ~lr. 
Thorsen now owns~ 
A. Yes, sir." 
Peterson also identified the piped spring in A rea 
X o. 1 as the one which flows into his fish pond and from 
there directly into the main channel (R.123). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
Thus the lower Court had before it the testin1ony of 
all four of Plaintiff's witnesses, all of whom at various 
times and for various periods, had experience with and 
knowledge of the Simper and Thorsen properties and of 
Spring Area No. 1, covering a period from 1908 to the 
present tin1e. All four witnesses testified that during the 
respective periods of time of which they had knowledge, 
some water was flowing down the 1nain channel to Plain-
tiff's property, which is not disputed by Appellants, who 
have always acknowledged that the water from the one 
piped spring in Spring Area No. 1, from high water run-
off, and fr01n his regular Gooseberry Creek rights and 
flow, rightfully belongs to Plaintiff. Appellants make no 
claim what,ev,er to these waters, nor is there one word 
of evidence in the record of any act of interference with 
these water rights. 
But the startling fact about Plaintiff's case is that 
each of said witnesses, and the Plaintiff hi1nself, also 
testified that during the 4-l: years covered by their cumu-
lative experience and extending back to the year 1908, 
a part of the 1cater from Spring Area No.1 has always ' 
flou.·,ed lf}JOJI the laud uo1c ou·ned by the Defendants. The 
Court obvjousl~, ignored this fact as well as the complete 
ah:-;eJH'P of any testiulOll,\' of actual appropriation and 
beneficial use of an~, water by Plaintiff's predecessors 
in interest prior to the year 1903, as required by law, in 
order to establish title in the Plaintiff. 
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Therefore, Appellants most earnestly contend that 
we are not confronted with the case where the evidence 
of Defendants' use and appropriation of water pre-
ponderates against that of the Plaintiff (Defendants will 
review their own case for appropriation later in this 
brief) but we have a situation where Plaintiff's case 
for appropriation and beneficial use of water is not sup-
ported by any admissible evidence and where Plaintiff's 
own case establishes Defendants' use of water from a 
part of Spring Area No.1 from 1908 until the trial. There 
is absolutely no evidence in the record, admissible or 
otherwise, establishing Plaintiff's right to any of the 
water from Spring Area No. 1. On the other hand, Plain-
tiff's own witnesses, taking their testimony in the light 
most favorable to him, establish 44 years of beneficial use 
by Defendants and their predecessors of the water of 
Spring Area X o. 1 except for the piped spring. 
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, we assert that 
the lower Court was required as a matter of law to refuse 
a. Decree to either party, because at that point neither 
party had yet established a lawful appropriation of water 
prior to the year 1903. Defendants went l'orwa nl wlwn 
the burden of proof shifted to them and established a p-
propriation and beneficial use of water prior to 1903 a~ 
will be pointed out hereinafter, but we reiterate that a~ 
the record stood at the end of Plaintiff's ea~P, no }Jrima 
facie cansc of action had been proved, and thP Court's 
failure and refusal to grant Defendants' ~r otion for Non-
suit, therefore, was palpable error. 
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Furtherrnore, the Court in its Decision and Memo-
randum (R. 10-14) as well as in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 15-17) obviously based its award 
to Plaintiff of all of the waters from Spring Area No. 1 
upon Plaintiff's case in chief. This does not represent 
a failure by the Court to properly weigh the evidence, 
but it is an outright instance of the Court ignoring com-
pletely entire pnrtions of Plaintiff's case where it applied 
to the Defendants and accepting it even beyond the limits 
of remote legal admissibility whenever it applied to the 
Plaintiff. Appellants assert that this type of decision 
is not in the interest of accomplishing justice and fair 
play and that it serves only to deprive one person of a 
valuable water right which he legally owns, and to award 
the said water to one whose own testimony and evidence 
shows him not to be entitled to. 
We conclude our attack upon the Plaintiff's case by 
simply restating our position: 
The Findings, Conclusions, and Decree of the lower 
Court should be reversed and new Findings, Conclusions 
and Decree should be entered in favor of Defendants as 
to all of the water from Spring Area No. 1 except for 
the one piped spring at the Northwest Corner thereof: 
1. Because the evidence clearl)· establishes and 
proves that "the Branch Spring of water" referred 
to in the ~fott-Si1nper Deed is in fact the same water 
source as the piped spring over which there is no contest 
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as far as Defendants are concerned, and also that Reser-
voir No. 2 is not part of the water involved in this liti-
gation. 
2. Because there is absolutely no competent admis-
sible evidence in the record to support Plaintiff's owner-
ship to any of the other waters of Spring Area No. 1. 
3. Because Plaintiff's own evidence establishes 
Defendants' beneficial use of all the water of Spring Area 
X o. 1, except for the one piped spring, back to the year 
1908. As pointed out below, Defendants' case for approp-
riation and beneficial user of the water at Spring Area 
X o. 1, except for the one piped spring, establishes legal 
title in them and their predecessors back to the year 
1887, against which there is not one iota of conflicting 
evidence in the record. 
POINT NO.5 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
AND REFUSING TO FIND, CONCLUDE AND DECREE 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE-NAMED ARE THE 
OWNERS OF ALL WATERS ARISING FROM SPRING AREA 
NO. 1, EXCEPT FOR THE ONE WATER SOURCE LOCATED 
IN THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID AREA AND ·COM-
MONLY REFERRED TO AS "BRANCH SPRING", AND RE-
FERRED TO ABOVE AS THE PIPED SPRING. 
POINT NO.6 
TRAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND 
REFUSING TO FIND, CONCLUDE AND DECREE THAT 
THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE NAMED ARE THE OWNERS 
OF ALL OF THE WATERS ARISING FROM THAT CERTAIN 
AREA KNOWN AND DESCRIBED AS "SPRING AREA NO. 
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2" AS DESCRIBED IN THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE 
IN THIS ·CAUSE AND AS SHOWN ON DEFENDANTS' EX-
HIBIT "A". 
Points 5 and 6 will be argued jointly. 
Defendants, by their Counterclaim to quiet title to 
Spring Areas 1 and 2, except for the piped spring at 
Area No. 1 ( R. 4-8) shouldered the burden of establishing 
a valid appropriation to said water prior in time to any 
possible claim of the Plaintiff or his predecessors in in-
terest. This was done without waiver of Defendants' 
fundamental position herein that the waters described 
in the J\1ott-8imper Deed (Exhibit "3") are not in con-
troversy here, but rather as a further protection of De-
fendant's rights. \Ye take the position that the ultimate 
proof of the ownership of the water described in Defend-
ants' Counterclain1 must be found in actual physical ap-
propriation of said water for a beneficial use at a time 
prior to that of the Plaintiff's predecessors. See Sowards 
et al v. Ill eaglz e1·, supra. For the reasons already pointed 
out we assert that the niott-Silnper Deed of 1888 is abso-
lute!)· ineffective to establish ownership of the water in-
volved in this action, and that the only evidence offered 
hy Plaintiff, admissible or otherwise, extends no farther 
back than 1908. Under the Utah la"T' in the absence of 
an)· statutor)· filing upon the water, this is insufficient 
aH a matter of law. 
\V e will now review Defendants' case showing ap-
propriation and beneficial use of the water from Spring 
... \rea~ 1 and ~ hy their predecessors in interest, starting 
in 1887. 
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Frank Casto, age 67 at the time of the trial, testified 
that he moved to the Gooseberry Canyon area with his 
parents, brothers and sisters in 1887 when he was three 
years of age (R. 156-157). The family settled on the 
property now owned by the Defendants. The original 
Casto cabin was built within the bounds of Spring Area 
No. :2. rrhe property was taken over from one Henry 
Russell, a squatter, (R. 160). Casto stated that he could 
recall events back to his fifth )'ear of life (R. 160) and 
that he could recall ~Ir. Russell (R. 161). At this time 
he observed that the property had been broken up and 
some crops had been planted. Russell apparently had 
been on the land for several years prior to the coming of 
the Castos. 
Casto's father, Abel N. Casto, broke up more land, 
planted crops, irrigated the property and ultimately pat-
ented it (Exhibit ''C"). Frank Casto's earliest childhood 
recollections with respect to the use of water on the home-
stead was that a portion of the water right came from out 
of Spring Area No. 1 (R. 162-163). Abel Casto used the 
ditches going out from Area K o. 1 which had been con-
structed by Henry Russell and extended them further 
onto the land (R. 163). The witness identified the two 
ditches extending from the Northeast and North center 
portions of Spring Area No. 1 on Exhibit "A" as being 
the same ditches he had helped his father extend and 
clean (R. l<i-1--Hi;)). Abel Casto irrigated r> to 8 aeres of 
alfalfa north of the Spring An•a No. 1 with this water, 
(R. 165), and this continued every summer during Casto's 
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ownership of the property and until it was sold to John 
~I. Bird (R. 167) after 43 years of ownership. l\1:oreover, 
the witness stated that he had personally irrigated the 
Casto farn1 with water from Area No. 1 (R. 167). Also, 
during all of this time the water from the one piped 
spring at the Northwest corner of Area No. 1 had flowed 
into the main channel of the wash and down to what is 
now the Simper property (R. 174). 
Regarding Spring Area No. 2, Casto's earliest re-
collection was that there was a small spring used for 
culinary purposes, but that as irrigation of the property 
to the north of Area R o. 1 increased, the flow from Area 
No. 2 increased, (R. 170). Thereafter, the water from 
a nun1ber of ''seeps" was used to irrigate a meadow and 
son1e shade trees east of the main channel of the wash 
(R. 171). Later a s1nall pond of water was built by the 
witness and his father to catch some of this water. This 
pond dried up soon and was not given any name, nor ever 
referred to as R-eservoir No.2 (R.176). 
Janie Nielsen, F·rank Casto's sister, testified that she 
was five years of age at the time the family moved to 
Gooseberry and that she could clearly recall events which 
occurred the day the family arrived in April, 1887 (R. 
20-!). ~lr~. Nielsen stated that as far back as she could 
recall she could ren1mnber seeing water flowing through 
ditches fr01n Spring Area No. 1 onto her father's prop-
erty (R. 209) and that she as a young girl often took 
]unrhes to her father and brothers while they put up hay 
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in the field. Her acquaintance with the property ended 
in 1906 when she moved away (R. 210). Mrs. Nielsen's 
testimony closely corroborates her brother's story as to 
the use and appropriation of the waters from Spring 
Areas 1 and 2 and she added that during all of the time 
she was on the land no objection was ever made to the 
use of the water nor was it ever interferred with by any-
one (R. 215). 
John :M. Bird, Defendants' next witness, age 55, testi-
fied that from the time he was a small child ( 1898) until 
1933, he lived in the cabin now belonging to Ernel 
Peterson just East of Spring Area No. 1 (R. 231) and 
that .:\fr. Bird's father, K. \V. Bird or Kelse)· \V. Bird 
ultimately patented the Peterson property. At the time 
of Mr. Bird's earliest recollection Abel Casto was farm-
ing the property North of Spring Area No. 1 (R. 233). 
jfr. Bird recalled that as a young boy he carried water, 
a quart at a time, from Spring Area No. 1 and that there 
were then two well marked diversionary ditches running 
therefrom and onto the Casto property (R. 234) for use 
in irrigating crops (R. 235). ~r r. Bird also worked for 
.:\Ir. Casto and irrigated the property on several occa-
sions (R. 236) .. Mr. Casto owned the present Thorsen 
property from the date of his Patent (1897) to 1933, but 
used Spring Area No. 1 waters from 1887. 
In 1933, Mr. Bird purchased the Casto property (Ex-
hibit "C"). Mr. Bird identified the appurtenant water 
rights referred to in his Deed from Abel Casto and read-
mg: 
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"Any other water that may have been used 
upon said land hertofore is hereby expressly re-
served from this grant, with the exception of a 
spring which rises on the land of K. W. Bird in 
the Southwest quarter of the Southrwest quarter 
of Section 19, Township 22 South, Range 2 East, 
Salt Lake 1\/f eridian, the said Wiater of said sprin9 
is to go with this land herein deeded to John M. 
Bird," 
as being the wa~er flowing frmn the ditches at the X orth-
east Corner and from the North center of Spring Area 
No. 1 (R. 238). This is the identical water which had 
been used on the property by Abel Casto (R. 239) start-
ing in 1887 and which Mr. Bird continued to use during 
the time he owned the Casto property. Mr. Bird irrigated 
a pasture and grain field for 13 years (R. 241). 
~Ir. Bird also stated that as far back as he could re-
call the water frmn the so-called "piped spring" had 
flowed into the wash ("'C" Ditch) and thence North to 
the property of the plaintiff (R. 2-!6). Also, no adverse 
rlai1ns to the use or ownership of the water at Spring 
Areas 1 or 2 was eYer n1ade by the Plaintiff or third per-
sons during the 2~~ years ~lr. Bird occupied the properties 
(R. :2-t'/). 
\Vjth reference to Spring Area No. 2, during Mr. 
Bird's ownership this water was used for culinary pur-
po~P~ part of the tin1e (R. 253) and it also irrigated a pas-
ture i1mnediatel:· adjacent to the spring (R. 249). 
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Teddy Bird, the brother of John }[. Bird, who lived 
in the Frands Peterson Cabin just east of Spring Area 
X o. 1 as a boy and who later obtained a lease on the old 
Kelsey Bird property abutting upon the Thorsen land, 
corroborated the prior testimony regarding the use made 
of the water from Spring Area No. 1 by Abel Casto and 
John ~1. Bird (R. 271-272). Mr. Bird stated th'at no ad-
verse claim to the use or ownership of the water had ever 
been made to his knowledge except that the Plaintiff had, 
on one occasion, complained about the Frands Peterson 
fish pond clamming off some of his ,,.a ter from the piped 
spring (R. 274-275). 
EvaluteHa Bird, John :JL Bird's wife, and a niece of 
the Plaintiff (R.. 278), corroborated her husband's testi-
mony of the use made of the spring waters from Areas 
1 and 2 covering the period from the time she married 
Mr. Bird in 1923 and moved to the cabin at Spring Area 
No. 2 until the property was sold to the Defendants in 
1946 (R. 279-282). 
Defendant Harry Thorsen, age ;)2 at the time of the 
trial, purchased the Abel Casto-J ohn ~~. Bird property 
in 1946. His testimony was largely concerned with a <1<·-
tailed analysis and description of the area involved in 
this action with particular regard to Spring Areas 1 and 
2, the main channel (Exhibit "A") and the piped ~pring·. 
He estimated the total flow of water onto thi~ land l'ro111 
the two ditches at Spring Area No. 1 at one-half ('nhi<' 
foot per second (R. 144). Since 1946 he has continuously 
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used all of the water from Spring Area No. 1, except for 
the piped spring, for the irrigation of 8 acres of alfalfa 
and pasture (R. 149-150) and for stock watering. The 
water from Spring Area No. 2 has been used to irrigate 
a pasture located largely within the boundaries of the 
Area itself (R. 153-298) and any excess has been used 
elsewhere on his property North of said Area. Prior 
to the sumn1er of 1951 no adverse claim hrad been made 
to .:\Ir. Thorsen by the Plaintiff or any third person re-
garding ownership of the water from either Spring Area 
No. 1 or Spring Area No. 2 or any part thereof (R. 299). 
~Ir. rrhorsen's deed on the former Abel Casto-J'ohn I\1. 
Bird farm contained a clause conveying to him "any and 
all waters or water rights thereunto belonging or in any-
wise appertaining ... " (Exhibit "G"). 
The Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay 
Land & Livest.ock Co. case, supra, well states the test to 
be applied to Defendant's evidence and testilnony for ap-
propriation of the waters from Spring Areas 1 and 2, 
except for the piped spring: 
"Until1903 when an exclusive method for ap-
propriating water wa8 prescribed by statute, 
water could be appropriated n1erely by diverting 
the water frmn its natural channel and putting it 
to a beneficial use.'' 
We sub1nit that the Defendant and his witnesses have 
established an irrefutable history showing diversion of 
\rat<' I' fl'olll Spring Areas 1 and:.? and application of that 
water to a beneficial n~e, extending 16 year~ prior to the 
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priation of water by diversion and beneficial use. w,e 
emphasize again that there is no evidence anywhere in 
the record to antedat,e this title. If everything in Plain-
tiff's case were construed in its 1nost favorable light, if 
the lVIott-Simper deed could in some way be construed 
to be a valid inception of title, S1aid Defendants have 
shown that they are prior in time to any possible claim of 
Plaintiff and his predecessors to the lawful ownership 
of this water. Defendants' case for title to said waters 
was based upon the oral testimony of witnesses as to 
diversion and beneficial use prior to 1903, that being the 
only method by which water could be appropriated in 
Utah when Defendants' predecessors appropriated these 
waters. The spirit as well as the context of their words 
shows that their only interest herein was to relate facts 
as they occurred. With the exception of Defendant Thor-
sen himself, they have no personal interest in this matter 
since none of the water involved here will benefit them in 
any way. \Ve are impressed with the fact that either 
all of them told the truth or all of them deliberately 
fashioned a giant falsehood. 
POINT NO.7 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IN THIS 
CAUSE. 
Appellants make no separate argument under this 
point except to state that Rule 59, of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provides that on a ::\lotion for a New 
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Trial, the Court n1ay grant a new trial, a1nend Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law or n1ake new Findings 
and Conclusions and direct the entry of a new Judgment 
upon the existence of either or both of the following situ-
ations, to-wit: 
" 
( 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the Yerdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law. 
(7) Error in law." 
lTpon the state of the record at the entry of the De-
cree Quieting Plaintiff's Title, we submit that it ought 
to have been apparent to the Court that the record was 
shot through with error and that the Decree was unsup-
portable frmn the evidence and testimony. We respect-
fully assert that to refuse to an1end the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law or to make new Findings and 
Conclusions and to enter a new Decree herein upon the 
state of the record before the trial court was an abuse of 
judicial discretion. 
POINT NO.8 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
FIND IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR UPON THE ISSUE OF 
DEFENDANTS' DAMAGES. 
If Defendants are the legal owners of the waters of 
Spring Areas 1 and :2, except for the piped spring, as we 
are confident we have deuwnstrated to the Court is the 
case, then the Defendants are entitled to dmuages for the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
diminution of the value of their crops and animals by 
reason of the Plaintiff's admitted taking of their water 
during the 1951 crop and feeding season. Bigler et al v. 
Fryer, et al, 82 Utah 380, 25 P. 2d 598. 
The Bigler v. Fryer case, supra, lays down the rule 
of assessment of damages for loss of water by wrongful 
diversion by another, to-wit: 
''The proper measure of damages for loss of 
water through wrongful diversion by another 
would be the rental value of the 7 hours of water 
lost or, if that be not obtainable, then the loss to 
the growing crops as a result of that loss of 
water. The correct me1asure of damage for the 
destruction of growing crops is the difference be-
tween the market value of the crops before and 
after the alleged damage; that in attempting to 
arrive at that damage it is proper to take into 
consideration the market value of the crops at ma-
turity if all water had been used and its value 
in its injured state because of lack of water." 
To the same effect see .Jensen c. Burch Creek 
Ranch, supra; also Peterson v. Cache Co,nty lhaimt(J(' 
District, 77 Utah 256, 294 P. 289. 
In 1950, the ye~ar prior to the taking of most of the 
water from Spring Area No. 1 by the Plaintiff, l\1 r. 
Thorsen irrigated from Spring Area No. 1 three aerPH 
of alfalfa and also used the water to support a pasture 
for fifteen huck sheep (R. 307). The 19·50 yield from the 
alfalfa field was a total of approximately 12 tons of J'i r:-;t 
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quality alfalfa (R. 307). In 19'50 first grade alfalfa sold 
at $30.00 per ton on the market (R. 317). Thus, the mar-
ket value of the 1950 alfalfa crop would be fixed at 
$360.00. 
In 1951, after the loss of most of his irrigation water, 
Jlr. Thorsen obtained a partial first cutting only from the 
alfalfa field for a yield of Vh tons (R. 310). The price 
per ton of hay in 1951 remained at $30.00 (R. 317). Thus 
the market value of the 1951 alfalfa crop was $45.00. 
By subtraction the difference between the market value 
of the Defendant's alfalfa crop before and after the dam-
age inflicted thereon by the Plaintiff could have been de-
tennined by the Court to be the sum of $315.00. 
In 1950 _Mr. Thorsen 1naintained upon the rest of his 
land irrigated from Spring Area No.1 a natural pasture 
for 15 buck sheep (R. 308). The natural pasturage had 
always been nwre than an1ple to maintain said animals 
in excellent condition for breeding purposes ·without any 
supplmnental feeding program (R. 308-309). However, 
in 1951, because of lack of water available at the pasture, 
the natural feed dried up (R. 311) and consequently 
said pasture becmne unusable for the 15 buck sheep being 
pastured there that sun1mer and Mr. Thorsen was re-
quired to renwve the anin1als to his fanu in Salina, Utah, 
for supple1nental feeding a 1uonth earlier than usual (R. 
312). 
Mr. Thorsen, a sheep grazer of \vide experience, de-
scribed the condition of the bucks as being "poor'' and 
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"in bad shape" at the end of the 1951 feeding season and 
he attributed this fact solely to the lack of sufficient na-
tural feed during the summer of 1951 (R. 313). The ani-
mals were in such poor condition that it was necessary for 
Defendant Thorsen to purchase two additional animals 
for breeding purposes (R. 315). :Moreover, Thorsen's 
1952 lamb crop was of a much poorer quality than usual 
and fifty of his ewes did not bear any lambs at all (R. 
316-318). This was a marked decrease in the fertility of 
his herd, since l\Ir. Thorsen had maintained an average 
lamb yield of 125% in the years prior to 1952 (R. 319). 
Thorsen estimated his entire loss in this regard, taking 
into consideration loss of animals, cost of supplemental 
feed, and poor quality of his herd at $1,000.00 (R. 318). 
Such an estimate of necessity had to be based upon a 
comparative valuation of the herd before and after the 
infliction of damage by the Plaintiff. The figure arrived 
at by Mr. Thorsen represented his computation of the 
difference between the value of his animals before and 
after the injury. 
vVe submit that the record clearly demonstrates that 
Defendants' evidence of damages is neither remote nor 
uncertain, but that it fulfills the requirements of law in 
every respect, and entitles Defendants to receive from 
this Court a Decree awarding to them damages in the 
sum of $1,315.00. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants urge upon the Court the necessity of a 
reversal of the lower trial Court's Decree because it is at 
once apparent from the record that, in addition to the fact 
that there is no admissible evidence to support the De-
cree in Plaintiff's favor herein, the record is replete with 
fully adn1issible and creditable evidence and testimony 
of Defendants' title to the waters in issue. \Y e are 
frankly unable to understand the matter or motive which 
i1npelled the trial Court to cast aside Defendants' entire 
case and to clothe with the dignity and force of law this 
unblushing "water grab" by the Plaintiff, especially in 
view of the complete absence of any proof to support 
Plaintiff's contended ownership. l\Iay we invite con-
sideration of this salient fact: If the Plaintiff or his 
father seriously entertained belief that the waters of 
Spring Areas 1 or 2, except for the piped spring, belonged 
to the1n, ·2rhy did they stand by for 64 years, from 1887 
to 1951, years during which they farmed side by side with 
the Defendant Thors,en and his predecessors in title, and 
z;ermit the constant and unint,errupted use of these 
1raters by Defendant and his predecessors, 1citlwut 1rag-
ing a single protest! There is but one reason; because 
Plaintiff and his father before hun knew in their hearts 
and their u1inds that the only water they owned from 
('ither Npring Areas 1 or :2 was the one piped spring . 
.. \IHl they had ahn1~~s received the full Ineasure of this 
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water until Frands Peterson dammed it off for his fish 
pond. Ther,e is not one word irn the record to dispute 
this fact. In view of Plaintiff's unconsciona:ble delay in 
asserting his claim there can be no doubt that Plaintiff 
and his father well knew that the Matt-Simper deed re-
ferred to only the piped spring and to one of the several 
storage reservoirs located at the top of the Gooseberry 
drainage area, some 8 miles frmn the farms of the 
Plaintiff and Defendants. 
The plain fact of the matter is that the quantity of 
irrigation water in Gooseberry Canyon is becoming 
smaller yearly ... an unhappy condition which is be-
coming more and more common in this arid country. 
Appellants can offer no explanation for the commence-
ment of this action other than that Leland Simper seized 
upon the desperate opportunity to purloin some of his 
neighbor's water rights. This is the most onerous of all 
types of litigation. 
Even so, Plaintiff did not have the temerity to seek 
by his Complaint a Decree quieting title to any alleged 
water rights, but instead sought to accomplish almost 
the same result by indirection in suing for damageH 
based on an alleged ownership. The trial Court refused 
to award Plaintiff damages, but instead "assumed" Plain-
tiff's title to something he did not own and quieted title 
in him. This was done despite and in the face of a emn-
plete record of evidence requiring the opposite n·~ ult. 
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We respectfully urge upon this Honorable Court the 
necessity of correcting the injustice which has accrued 
to the Defendants in this action and of reversing the 
trial Court's Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CARVEL MATTSSON 
AND 
JOHN T. VERNIEU 
FOR 
GusTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
A. ppellants 
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